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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
PRLTDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN A8SOCIA'TION, a corporation,
Plaintiff a nd Rrspondcnt,
1

-vs.'l HE ST. PAUL INSURANCE COMPANIE8,
Defendant and Appellant,
1

Case No.

107G5

and
FlR81 Al\lERICAN TITLE INSURANCE AND TRUST COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.
1

REPLY BRIEF OF PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION

PrndPntial Ft!d(•ral Savings & Loan Association has
fil<·d this action for a df'claratory judgment

n~garding

the

l'i<ldity bonJ issut>d to it by Appellant, and the District
Court has entPrC>d such decalartory judgment interpreting tlt<• t<•rms thNeof. Respondent (hereinafter referred
t1J

ns ''Prudential") asks for affirmance of such judg-

Ii Ii'] It.

2

StTATE,MENT OF FACTS
We feel that the statenwn t of facts submitted by
appellant omits basic factual matters as related to the
positon of Prudential n this proceeding. ThPS(~ facts are
set forth as follows:
On or about June 30, 19GO, appellant issued its
fidelity bond, No·. 404-F09886-B, with $1,000,000.00 coverage on all of Prudential's employees. Delmer D. Rowley was tht>n such an employee, and during 1962 to 196(i
was one of it:,, Loan Offict>rs charg<>d with closing loans
for Prudential. No dispute exists as to the fact of the
employment of Delmar D. Rowley during the effective
period of the fidelity bond, and that the said fidelity
bond was before the court (Exh. P-1) though not intro~
duced actually in evidence by stipulation until after tlw
order was made by the court.

It was discovered in 1965 that said Rowley ha<l
apparently embezzled or wrongfully applied the proceeds of four different loans which he had handled as
Loan Officer for his employer, Prudential, in the follmring amounts: $14,900.00 in December, 19G2; $17 ,S-±5.20
in October, 1963; $14,389.57 in Decembt>r, 19Ci4; $17, -1-37.75 in March of 19G-t-. If e was chargt'd with su<"h eri11w
in the Unitt>d Statt>s District Court, District of lTtah, in
Case No. CR 66-65, Unit rd States of A111crira v. Del111l'r
D. R011.'lry, and aftPr a plPa of ''not g·uilt,\''' \Ya~ f'onuil
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µ;nilty by a jury of violating Section 657, Title 18, United
Slates Code Annotat0d, as charged on all four counts, and
on July :2G, 19G5, he was s0ntenced to be imprisoned in
pursuance of such and :omhsequently was imprisoned and
served his s0ntence for 0rnlwzzlPnwnt.
The def 0ndant St. Paul Insurance Companies paid
to PrudPntial the amotmt of the embezzlements on the
last thre0 items noted above, but has refused to pay the
first mw, being the so-called "Parker Loan." Demand
for tlw payment of the said four losses under the terms
of tltP policy was made at tlw same time, and St. Paul
has assr>rted that it has a dc~fonse to the payment of the
fourth one, namely the Parker Loan embezzlement, on the
grounds of "otlL<T indernnit~v," or "other insurance" proYision:-; of itf; policy.
The> indPnmity bond was idfmtified in the complaint
by s1wcific number, and hence no uncertainty existed
in th<c• mind of the defendant St. Paul as to the nature
of it, and it hy its answPr duly admitted that for valuable
eo.nsidPration r<'ePiwd it lmd issued to the plaintiff its
~aid policy as idPntifil~d, ·which provides tlw ind0mnification sd forth therein. rrhP said policy is specific in its
t\•nns and conditions, and particularly paragraph I of
tlw insuring- clamws providPs:
( A) l. "Any lo:,;s by reason of any dishonest,
f"ramlnlent or rriminal act of any emvloyee as
ltPrPtofore ddinc'd, or of any director or tnrntee
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of the insured while performing acts coming within the scope of the usual duties of an 0mployee,
including loss o.f property by reason of any su0h
act of any such employee, and also including the
dishonest issue of stock, share or investment certificates by any such employee, whether acting
alone or in collusion with others.n
The ma.~imum amount of su0h coverage is $1,000,000.00.
The fidelity bond policy contains the exclusion clause
which is at issue in this declaratory judgment, namely:
"OTHER INSFRANiCE.-If the insured holds
other valid or collectible indemnity against any
loss, covered hereunder, tht~ Undt>rwriter shall lw
liable hereunder only for such amount of such los:>
as is in excss of the amount of such oth('I' indemnity, not exceeding the amount of coveragP hereundPr."
First American, through its local title insurance
agent, Security Title Company, had issued and delivered
to Prudential its preliminary report on the Parker loan
transaction on December 21, 1962. 'Phe embezzlement by
Rowley was on December 26, 1962. A policy of title
insurance was issued to Prudential in August, 196.1, which
omitted the First Federal prior mortgage (duly shown
in the preliminary report) though in fad thr Fir:o;t
Federal mortgage had not b('rn paid and 'ms st ill a first
lien ahead of the Parker mortgage. It is this policy
of title insurance, issued Pight months aft<•r l\lr. H<m-

h•y's wrongful taking of the mortgage loan funds, which
~t. Paul ('laims is ''otlwr insurance" or "other indemnity."

In the nwantinw, the ddendant St. Paul had brought
lwfon~ the court on its motion the defrndant First American. 1t is to he not Pd hat no counterclaim or cross-claim
11 as filed h.'T the dPfrndant St. Paul against First Ameri('ttn, and hence the court ~was hound to make its determination prPClicated upon the complaint itself, which was
solel)T for declaratory judgment as to the interpretation
of the language of the fidelity bond, the prayt>r ending:

"\VlterPfore plaintiff prays that the court
mah a dPclarator.'T judgmmt as to the liability
of defendant in this matter to it under the terms
of its po lie)'; and interpret the policy and issue
.indg1:1Pnt stating \\'lwther or not the said defendant is excused from its liability by reason of tlw
existence of the :-;aid policy of title insurance
\Yhieh \\"as issn<'cl in Angust, 1%3, though the
rnorn·:T '''as appropriafrd in Decemher of l 9G2.''
'!'lie J)istrid Co1ut consi<ll·red thP matters lwfore it on
~lotion

for

Srn1mmr~T

.Judgin<'nt (H. 27 and 30) and Affi-

da,·it (R. i33), l\l<·1110rnndnm (H. -Hi), and statements of
er'lllls(•l,

and mad<> its Findings of Fad and Summary

.J udgrn<•nt in ptusmUH'<' of' the prn.n•rs for declaratory

11Hl'..2,·111<'nt as to th<• int<·rp1·etation of tlw tr•rms of tl1r•
;: 111

l 11 ind.
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The contents of the Affidavit of Mr. Hayden M.
Calvert, Vice-President of Prudential (R 33-36) do not
appear to be controverted and hence such are adopted
'vithout restatement here.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ACTION WAS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND THE COURT FAIRLY MET THE ISSUE
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE DOCUMENTS TO BE INTERPRETED AND THE RESPONSE OF THE PARTIES.
TO THE PLEADINGS IN THE PROCEEDING.
POINT II
TH RULES OF THE COURT WERE FOLLOWED
IN THE PRESENTATION OF THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND THE DEFENDANTS
WERE AFFORDED FULL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THEIR POSITION BEFORE THE COURT
PRIOR TO THE RENDITION OF JUDGMENT.

As this is a procedure for dt'claratory judgment, it
seems appropriate to refresh our minds as to the jurisdiction in these matters. Section 78-33-1 lJ.C.A. 195:3
reads:

7
".Jurisdiction of district courts - Form Effrct. - 'L'lw district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have po\wr to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations, whether
or not further reliPf is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is
1
pray(~d for. '1 he declamtion may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such
drclarations shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree."
~(~etion

78-33-2 U.C.A. 1!153 reads:

"Rights, status, legal relations under instrultJPnts or statute ma.\· be determined. - Any person interested under a deed, will or written
contraet, or whose rights, status or other ll'gal
relations an• aff<::~rted by a statutl', municipal ordinanrP, eontract or franchise, may have determined an)· qrn•stion of construction or validity
arising under tlw instrument, statute, ordinance,
contract or franchise and obtain a dt>-claration of
rights, status or other legal relations tlwrt'under.
Tlw statntPs and eases make it clear that the Court
:-:hall constnw contracts, (•ithPr before or after breach
and tliPn~h.\· eliminate any uncertainties which exist. All
parti('S having a din•ct interest in the contract or issue
ma.\· lw joirn•d and the <lPkrmination made by the Court
i:-; binding. 8f'ction 78-33-12 U.C.A. 1953 deelarPs this
<"11aptr>r to lw "n'!ll(•dial" tn settle uncertainty an<l in:--1•1·t1rity with l'P:Slllod to rights and lPg-al relations "and
111 lw l1h('rallY cmrntnwcl arnl ad111inisten•d. ''
1

8
Consistent decisions affirm the general purpose of
the chapter to enable parties to seek and receive answers
to contractual disputes. The interpretation of the "other
insurance" or "other indemnity" exclusion clause of the
$1,000,000.00 fidelity policy issued by St. Paul is a classical situation for determination by declaratory judgment.
In Gray v. Defa, 103 U. 339, 135 P.2d 251, this Court held
that in such an action a counterc1rum could be filed if
neeessary to seek a final adjudication of rights (here to
quiet title). This decision refers to the wide jud~cial
discretion granted to the judge in these declaratory
judgment procePdings.
In our pending case we believe it to be significant
that appellant, St. Paul, has not sought assistance by
counterclaim or cross-eomplaint. Its Answer (R 5) defends on the "other insurance or indemnity" theory and
prays only that it have "judgment doolaring it to have
no liability to plaintiff." The document then contains a
Motion to bring in First American so that complete
relief may be accorded.
Some eomplaint is found in appellant's brief that
the Affidavit in support of the Motion for Surmnary
Judgment was filed and served on appellant on July H
and the argument was on July 18. The Motion had been
served by plaintiff on July 1 by mail. "\Ve find no offense
to the Rules by this timing. Accompanying the Affidavit
on July 14 was a Memorandum In Support of l\fotion

9

for Summary Judgment. Thus counsel was fully advised
well in advance of the hearing date, not only of the
1Iotion, the Affidavit, but also of plaintiff's legal argument as reflected by the :Memorandum. No surprise can
be claimed. We do not wish to wrestle with a procedural
interpretation of Rule 56(c) on the need for filing Affidavits at least ten days before hearing of the Motion for
Sununary Judgment. Said subsection merely provides
that th<-' "motion shall be served at least 10 days before
the time fixed for the hearing."
In the Court's discretion, had he felt that any imposition was being felt by defendants, the matter could
have bt>en continued. Counsel for St. Paul was permitted
to make a tender of proof, the matter was argued on its
merits and the decision rpached. Thereafter Findings
and Smmnary Judgment were duly served, .July 20, 1966,
and St. Paul filed its Motion to Amend the Findings and
.Judgment (R. 63) on August 1, 1966, and then on Septemlwr 22, 1966 filed two Affidavits in support of such
Motion (R. 73-80). These wPre duly argued October 18,
1966 and the l\Iotion to Anwnd was denied October 19,
1966. Amplt> consideration was thus afforded to St. Paul
on its Affidavits and no real prejudice can be asserted
on the timeliness of the original Affidavit filed by plaintiff.

It is interesting to note that the Affidavit by Mr.

Calvurt, Vice PrPsidPnt of Prudential, is criticized hy
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appellant as not being ·within the purvit>w of Rule 5G( c),
but one of St. Paul's Affidavits is by Mr. Palmer, counsel
for 8t. Paul.
vVe belit>Vf' that the discrPtionary powers of tlw
Court under the declaratory judg1nents act have been
wisely exercised. No abuse of time requirements has
existed. Appellant, St. Paul, was afforded ample opportunity to make tenders of proof, file affidavits, make
motions and argue the matter twieP. 'The procedural
steps taken are ample to satisfy all requirements of du<>
proct>ss of justiee.
POINT III
NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT EXISTED, NOT
COVERED BY THE AFFIDAVITS BEFORE THE
COURT, WHICH WAS NECESSARY FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PRAYER AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
THE INDEMNITY BOND BEFORE THE COURT.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE INDEMNITY BOND, AND PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NO
"OTHER INSURANCE" OR "OTHER INDEMNITY"
SO AS TO EXCLUDE THE LIABILITY FOR THE
DEFALCATION AND DISHONEST ACTS OF THE
EMPLOYEE ROWLEY.
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rrl1e real issue is the interpretation of appellant St.
Paul's own chosen language in its escape clause in the
indemnity bond. At the inception we call to the Court's
attention the time-tested rule of strict construction on
exclusionary provisions of a policy of insurance. This
fidelity bond must be constrm•d as coverage of the "loss
hy reason of any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act
of any employee." Tlw "other insurance" or "other indPmnity" provision is an exception, exclusion or limitation. Liberal construction in favor of the insured is
enjoin<>d on the Court. In decisions your Court has reforred to this as "strictissimi juris."
Prudential has sought aid from the Court in the
problem of proper interpretation of this exclusionary
clause. Four loan proceeds were misapplied by the Loan
Offir('r, Rowh•y. Claim for all four losses was made upon
:St. Paul. Three of the losses were paid, hut the Parker
loan loss was denied because of the "other insurance or
other indemnity" clause as stated in the Answer.
Prudential thus finds itself between two insurance
rompanies. No one denies its loss by reason of the taking
of Uw funds by Rowley. 1'he jury in the United States
District Court found him guilty of such and he was imprisom•d for the same. rl1he requirement of the fidelity
bond eoverage, "any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal
ad of any employee" has lwen met. At the time of the

taking· of the fonds

h~·

tlw Loan OfficPr, Rowlf'y, no
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title insurance was in force or effect. Only a preliminary
title report was in its files. Some eight months lah'r a
policy of title insurance was issued. Tlw titlt> cornvany
says that this was by mistakt>: defrnses an~ asserted that
thl' knowledge of Rmvley as Loan Officer was knmvledge
of Prudential. Even St. Paul, in its brief, says that tlH'
title insurance agent issued the policy by mistake (p. 5).
After evaluating the problt'lll, Prudimtial elt>cted to
seek a judicial determination and has by its complaint
alleged its position that appt'llant Rt. Paul is liable under
the fidt>lity bond. Prudential dot>s not 1wlieve that the
policy ('Xclusion gives St. Paul an Pscape from the clear
terms of the covering, insuring clause.
The following provisions in the bond in question are
tlw critical phrases:
"Otlwr insurancP. 1f the insured holds other valid
or collectible indemnity against any loss, covered
hereunder, the Underwriter shall be liable hereunder fo.r such amount of such loss as is in excess
of such other indemnity not e~weeding the amount
of coverage lwreunder."
This exdusion in defendant's policy is not applicahl<>
unless there is "otht>r valid or collectihl<> imlemnity
against loss covert>d herPnndt>r. . . ." flneh does not
e>xcuse defpndant from liability on tlw bond because tlw
poJicy of titlP insurane<' do<>s not eow'r t1J<> t~-ll<' of los~
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or losses indemnified by this fidelity bond and because,
as will be discussed below, the title policy may be unrnforceahle as the title insurer asserts that it was issued
as a result of mistake of a material fact, and was not
intmded to cover embezzlement risks which St. Paul
claims.
The universal rule is that "other'' insurance, as
used in defendant's bond, exists only where more than
ont> policy of insurance covers the same interest, in the
sanw property, against the same risk, for the same perrnn. There is "otlwr insurance'' only where the insured
undertakes to insure the same thing twice over against
the same perils. \VhE>rf' one of the above elements is
missing tlwrP is no double insurance. :29A Am. Jnr. p.
15:-l, lmmrance Section 9Gl; Couch, Cyclopedia of InsurancP Law, page 8685.

It is quite obvious that the· two policies of insurancP lwre involved (one a fidelity bond insuring against
tliP dishont>st acts of an officer, and the other a title
insuranre policy insuring only the trust deed beneficiary's intPr<'st in spl~cific pro1wrty) are completely dissimilar, and do not insure against the same peril. The
fidPlit~· policy spt>rifically covt>rs, indeed is directly
aimPd at, the prt>cise situation here involved; wlwreas,
tlw policy of titl<> insurance srwcifically excludes from
<'OY<·rngl'

insurance against encumbrances created or suf-

l'(·J·t•d lJ~· the insured or known to tl1t> insun•d and un-
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known to the insurer. No one n~asonahly can contend
tha.t a policy of title insurance covers the peril of defalcating officer's fraudulent failure to remove an encurnhrance through his personal use of funds.
The burdPn of proving that there is double insurance
rests with the insurance company pressing that there is
an exception to its covPrage. 5 Appleman, p. 1'70, 80c.
3055. Defendant cannot under any factual situation here
involved sustain the burden of showing that the two
policies in question insured the same property against
the same risk.
The two types of insurance, fidelity insurance and
title insurance, represent entirely differPnt breeds of
coverage. Vv e must consider the definitions set by tlH'
Utah statutes, which are as follows:
31-11-8. "'Surety immrance' defined. - Surety
insurance ... (3 fidelity insurance, which is insurance guaranteeing the fidelity of persons holding po.sitions of public or private trust;''
31-11-10. " '·Title insurance' defined. Title insurance is insurance of owners of property or others
having an interest therein, against loss by encumbrancP, or defoctive titl0s, or adverse clairn
to title, and services eonn<:et<'<l tlH'l'Pwith."

Chapter 25 of Title 31 deals sol<'ly with titk, insurancl~
and 31-25-14- spells out tllP insuring- powPn; as follow::;:

15
"Insuring powers. - Every domestic title insurer
may isslw title polici<>s and may also insurP:
(1) thP identity, due execution and validity
of any notP or bond SN'UrPd by mortgage;
(2) the identity, dut> ext>cutio.n, Yalidity and
1·<·cording of any snch mortgage;
(:~) tlw identity, dut> execution and validity
of <'VidPncP of indebtedness issued by this state
or hy any political subdivision or distriict therein,
or by any private or public corporation."

As applied to our prest>nt problem, it becomes obvious that the belated title insurance po.licy is not "otht>r
insman<'('" as related to the esca11e clause in the defendant's fidelity bond defined as "other valid and collPdiblt> indemnity." :t\aturally the Court will apply tlw
rnle of striet construction to this escape clausf'.
Prudt-ntial is faced with the position of First American that the policy of titlt> insurance spPCifically provides
it "doPs not immrt- against loss or damage by reason of
... d\'frets, liens, Pncumbrances, adverst> claims against
thC> tith· as insurt-d or other matters" where such defects,
lic>ns, encwnbram·ps or advt•rse claims were, among other
things,
" ( 1) en•ated, suffon•cl, assmHPd or agreed to
11\· tl1<> insur\'d daim!r.i!.' loss or damage; 01·
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''(2) known to the Insured Claimant at thP
date such insured Claimant acquired an estate or
interest insun~d by this policy and not known to
the Company (meaning the title insurance eom
pany) or not shown by the public records; or

"(3) result(ed) m no loss to the insun,<1
rlaimant."

It is fundamental that a corporation can act and b<~
bound onl~r through individuals acting as its officers or
agents. 19 Arn. J ur. 2d Corporations, Sec. 1079. It i:s
also a fundamental rule pertaining to agents generally
that the knowledge of an officer or agPnt will be imputed
to the corporation. 19 Am ..Jnr. 2d Corporations, Sec.
1263. In the specific transaction here involved Delmer
D. Rowley, as Loan Officer and Assistant Secretary, was
the agent and officer through whom the particular transaction was consummated on behalf of Prudential.
Appellant, St. Paul, has asserted an excPption to this
gEmeral rule, recognized by some authorities, to the effect
that where an officer or agent of a corporation or association is acting in a transaction in which he is personally or adversely intt>rested or is engaged in tlw
perpetration o.f an independmt fraudulent transaction,
and the knowledge relates to such transaction and it
\\'ould be to his interest to coneeal it, it would lw unreasonable to presunw that thP offieN or agent of the
corporation \\'Ould (·om1mmicat<> snelt kiw\\·l<'dgr> to tlw
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rnq)oration, and therPfore, the• knowledge is not impnt<>d. 'l'h(:' wisdom of this (:'Xception, at least where thP
circumstances involve officers of a corporation through
whom alone thC' corporation can act, has been doubted,
~ee Pomeroy, Equity .Jurisprudence, 3 Ed. S(•c. G75. This
Pxception is not applicable in th(' circumstances here involved, hm11 eV('r. For on(' reason, that eXiception applies
only where a third 1wrson seeks to enforce som(' demand
against the corporation and has no application when the
corporation S('eks to enforcP a contract entered into by
surlt officPr on its behalf. Gordon v. Continrntal Casually Co., 319 p. 555, 181 A. 57 4. This is certainly analogous
to the pr('sent situation where the cmblezzlement was in
December, 19G2 and the title insurance contrad was procured in August, 1963, by the same corporate officer.
1

1

It will be noted that the exclusion in the title policy
sperifically excludes encumbrances "known to the insured claimant at the time such insured claimant acquired
an estate of inter('st insured by this policy." Prudential
is faced with the position of First American that the
enc.umbranc-P here involved was fully known to its trust
officer and assistant secretary, Delmar D. Rowley. In
thP case where an officer or agent acts fraudulently,

(·ven though he acts for himself or a third person and
ilU\'Pl"sPly to the corporation, if he is the sole representative of the corporation in the transaction in question,
lh1· eorporation will, according to the generally prevail-

111:.:. viPw, hC' cha.rged with the knowledge of the officer
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or agent. 19 Am. Jur. 2d. p. G73, Corporations, Sec. 12G7.
Fremont Trust Co. v. Noyes, 2+6 Mass. 197, 1+1 N:E~. 9:\
(1923).
Appellant, St. Paul, has maintained fidelity insurance for sevC'ral years against any fraudulent ads on
behalf of Delmer D. Rowley. Rowley's fraudulent conduct occurred before the policy of title insurance was
mistakenly issued; therefore, the fidelity insurance fully
covered this defalcation of Rowley.
Prudential is caught in the position of two insurancP
companies arguing as to which has the covnage on a
loss sustained by it, and is of the oyiinion that the title
policy does not and was not intended to cover the risk
of "encumbrances" suffered because of the defalcations
of one of its trust officers. ·when it obtained a bond
from appellant, St. Paul, and paid a premium, it was
for the very purpose to cover such risks. The policy of
title insurance did not insure against this type risk and
is, therefore, not "other insurance" within the exdusionary clause in defendant's bond.
Review of the authorities cited by appellant indicate·s that it is casting the whole defense on the theory
that the fidelity insurance is mert>ly "excpss '' to otlH'l'
insurance. These citations all sPem to resolve themselves into a pattern that "excess'' insurance applies only
where similar type and charadur policiC's of immrnn<'('
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or indemnity exist. As shown above, fidelity insurance
and titlP insurance are two different breeds of insurance. By statutes, by coverage and by language, each
has an identity apart from tht> other.

·we assume that

First American will brief and discuss this more in particular. Prudential had no other
fidelity insurance to protect against loss from fraudulent or dishonest acts of its own employees. This loss
was an "inside job." The title insurance policy coverag-e was against extraneous causes of loss.
CONCLUSION
Prnd(mtial mges this court to affirm the declaratory
judgment of the District Court. Due procedural steps
wsted tlw trial court with jurisdiction and sound disCTt>tionary powers were then exercised in confonnance
11-ith the Rule on declaratory judgments and the spirit
of such rule to afford a proper interpretation in the
eon::;truction of the language of the fidelity insurance
policy.
Respectfully submitted,

PUGSLEY, HA YES,
RAMPTON & 'VA'TKISS
HARRY D. PlJGSLEY

